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After the Storm:
How Environmental Racism Impacted the United States’ Response to Hurricane Maria
Hadley Ankrum

Abstract
In September of 2017, disaster struck the territory of Puerto Rico when Hurricane Maria made
landfall on the island. Although the storm itself caused tremendous damage to both the residents
and the environment of Puerto Rico, the inadequate responses of both the United States federal
government and local Puerto Rican politicians greatly exacerbated this devastation. This paper
examines the efforts of the American government to ameliorate the issues created by the storm
through the lens of environmental racism. The introduction will explore the events of the
hurricane in order to give the reader context. Chapter 1 draws from the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment and employs data from third-party research organizations and media outlets such as
the Washington Post and the Associated Press in order to demonstrate the extent of the wreckage
caused by the storm. Chapter 2 explains the theories and research completed in the topics of
environmental racism and environmental justice. Chapter 3 then delves into the history of the
often contentious relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico in order to
contextualize the current situation in the territory. Chapter 4 explores the policies that influenced
the United States government’s actions following the storm. It also contrasts these decisions with
the government’s responses to other natural disasters such as Hurricane Irma and Hurricane
Harvey. This juxtaposition serves to highlight the underlying racial and political motivations
present in the case of Hurricane Maria. Chapter 5 examines the state of the island’s current
healthcare system as well as the manners in which the United States’ actions have affected the
health of the Puerto Rican population. In Chapter 6, I offer recommendations based on evidence
presented in chapters 2 through 5. While I will not attempt to prove whether or not Hurricane
Maria was caused or exacerbated by climate change, several of my suggestions will be based
upon the consensus by numerous scientists and meteorologists that the phenomenon is currently

playing a role in the occurrence of Caribbean storms. I will also discuss the role that grassroots
movements should play in the environmental justice movement in Puerto Rico. Finally, I will
give suggestions on how the United States should proceed in its relationship with the territory
and conclude that the United States needs to prove its willingness to provide assistance of all
sorts to Puerto Rico if it wishes to maintain control of the island.
Keywords: Environmental racism, Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico, public health, natural disasters,
post-colonialism
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Introduction: The Storm of the Century
On the evening of September 19th, 2017, millions of Puerto Rican residents shuttered
their blinds, turned off the lights, and closed their eyes on their beautiful, serene island for the
last time. The next day, they awoke to a horrific natural disaster that was sure to impact every
aspect of their lives for the next several months, if not for the rest of their lifetime. At 6:15 am
local time, Hurricane Maria made landfall onto the southeast coast of Puerto Rico. As the storm
made its way across the island, its maximum wind speed was recorded at 155 miles per hour and
was considered to be a “high-end category 4 hurricane” for the majority of this journey.1 No
community on the 5,500 square mile island was left untouched; homes were destroyed,2 schools
had to be closed for several weeks for repairs,3 and the nation’s infrastructure such as bridges
and highways suffered serious damage. The latter issue only exacerbated the devastation, as it
made it nearly impossible to send aid to areas in crisis. In addition, citizens had to endure an
island-wide power outage and prolonged issues with cellular service4; these blackouts markedly
complicated rescue efforts and severely jeopardized the lives of those in need of medical
assistance. Despite this fact, the Puerto Rican government, supported by United States President
Donald Trump, attributed the shockingly low number of 64 deaths to Hurricane Maria.5 For
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many U.S. citizens in Puerto Rico as well as on the mainland, this figure did not correspond with
the incredible amount of destruction that the storm had caused. As the months passed, it became
clear that they were correct to be suspicious.
In August 2018, almost one year after the storm, The Milken Institute School of Public
Health at George Washington University published an extensive report on the mortality rate of
Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico. According to their calculations, 2,975 Puerto Ricans died as a
direct or indirect result of the hurricane.6 In addition, the report also stated that many of these
deaths could have been preventable had the government responded more readily to the disaster.7
When comparing the response of the U.S. government to the aftermath of Hurricane Maria to its
reaction to other hurricanes on the mainland, it is evident that Puerto Ricans citizens were the
victims of environmental racism. While it is certainly understandable that they experienced some
hardships as a result of storm, the United States government neglected to provide the territory
with the resources necessary to ameliorate the situation in a timely manner. This resulted in
thousands of needless casualties.
In this thesis, I will demonstrate that the aftermath of Hurricane Maria was a case of
environmental racism by contrasting it with the events of other U.S. hurricanes that occurred in
recent years, such as Hurricanes Harvey and Irma. In addition, I will also explore the past and
present relations between the United States and Puerto Rico in order to provide context for the
U.S. government’s response to the storm. Chapter 1 will supply the reader with quantitative
information concerning how Hurricane Maria impacted food, water, and disease on the island.
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Chapter 2 will describe environmental racism as a concept in order to provide the reader with
appropriate context. Chapter 3 will examine the history of Puerto Rico as a U.S. territory and the
ways in which this relationship was a form of colonialism. Chapter 4 will discuss the policies
that affected the U.S. government’s response to Puerto Rico, and how these actions contrasted
with those performed for the aforementioned mainland hurricane. Chapter 5 will delve into the
public health crises Puerto Rico faced as a result of the storm, and chapter 6 will conclude with
my policy recommendations as to how to prevent a similar case in the future.
Chapter 1: Facts and Figures from Hurricane Maria
In the Ecosystems and Human Wellbeing: General Synthesis, The United Nations
outlines four principal categories of ecosystem services. The first group is known as supporting
services, and include activities such as primary production, nutrient cycling, and soil formation.
The second category is provisioning services, and include any material that provides for an
organism’s basic needs, such as food, fresh water, and fuel. The third group, known as regulating
services, encompasses climate, flood, and disease regulation, as well as water purification. The
final grouping is known as cultural services, and entails the educational, recreational, aesthetic,
and spiritual benefits an ecosystem can provide.8
The devastation caused by Hurricane Maria impacted several of these ecosystem services
that are typically rendered in Puerto Rico. However, as this thesis examines how humans were
directly affected by this natural disaster, it does not assess the damage inflicted on Puerto Rico’s
supporting services. While this chapter does not specifically address the loss of cultural services,
chapter 5 will discuss the negative impact the storm had on mental health, which typically falls

8

“Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: General Synthesis,” Millennium Ecosystem Assessment,
2005, vi, accessed September 11th, 2018,
http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf.

4
into this category. The island also suffered measurable depletions of its provisioning services,
particularly to its food and water resources. Within mere hours, Hurricane Maria destroyed $780
million worth of crops in Puerto Rico. As this was approximately 80% of the territory’s crop
value, such a loss is devastating not only for the individual farmers, but for the island’s
government as well. In addition, it is important to note that only 15% of crops grown in Puerto
Rico are exported to other regions.9 Because of this, the crop loss caused by Hurricane Maria
was extremely harmful to the general population of the island as well. Even though 80% of
Puerto Rico’s food supply is exported from other areas, many of these nations, such as the
Dominican Republic, St. Martin’s, and Dominica, suffered damage from the storm as well; these
losses further minimized the territory’s food supply.1011 Even when Puerto Rican citizens were
able to obtain food, they could not always properly store it. According to a joint survey
conducted by the Washington Post and the Kaiser Family Foundation, 70% of Puerto Ricans
who completed the questionnaire said that due to the prolonged power outages on the island, it
was often a challenge for them to store and prepare fresh food.12
In addition to a lack of edible crops on the island, Puerto Ricans also had immense
difficulties securing potable water after Hurricane Maria. Over 230 rural communities on the
island rely on wells or springs for their water supply, and many of these sources were damaged
during the storm.13 In the aftermath of the hurricane, 20% of those surveyed reported that they
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drank from a stream or river due to lack of available clean water.14 Residents reported still
having issues with their water in the summer of 2018, almost one year after the hurricane. At that
time, 50% of citizens surveyed stated that there was not enough available drinking water for their
households.15 In addition, 53% of Puerto Rican residents were still wary of the water quality in
their homes.16 Despite this, the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority stated that
approximately 99% of their clients had good service by August 2018. However, the remaining
1% translates to about 8,000 families without water. The former percentage also does not
account for rural families, many of which are not serviced by the Aqueduct and Sewer Authority
and could therefore still be facing difficulties obtaining clean water. As of August 2018, 27
municipalities in Puerto Rico were still relying on water pumps powered by emergency
generators.17
The potable water crisis experienced by Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria not only
affected the island’s provisioning services, but its regulating services as well. Specifically, the
territory was faced with potential outbreaks of communicable diseases due to a lack of clean
drinking water. A month after the hurricane, 20 of Puerto Rico’s 51 sewage treatment plants
were still not operational, causing much of the untreated water to flow into nearby streams and
rivers.18 These massive leaks were determined to be the origin of a leptospirosis outbreak. In the
weeks after the storm, ten residents of Puerto Rico became infected with leptospirosis, and four

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp/2018/09/12/feature/water-is-everything-but-for-many-inpuerto-rico-it-is-still-scarce/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ea3741993c94.
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died as a result of the disease.19 The number of suspected cases of the disease was eventually
stated to be 74 by the office of Ricardo Roselló Nevares, the governor of Puerto Rico.20
Following this announcement, CNN performed an investigation on the number of deaths caused
by leptospirosis and eventually found that 22 additional deaths had been attributed to the disease
by the Puerto Rico Demographic Registry. However, these were not counted in the final death
toll as many of the individuals died after October 20th, which is the date that the Puerto Rican
government ceased to attribute leptospirosis deaths to Hurricane Maria. Still, it is important to
note that experts who have reviewed the data believe that such a high number of leptospirosis
deaths is unusual.21 Although the exact number of leptospirosis-related deaths that were caused
by Hurricane Maria is unclear, it is certain that the storm had a tremendous impact on the spread
of the disease.
Chapter 2. Environmental Racism: A Brief Primer
In order to fully understand the social ramifications of the United States’ response to
Hurricane Maria, it is necessary for the reader to have a basic knowledge of two key concepts:
environmental justice and environmental racism. Defining these two terms is a rather challenging
task; it has been noted that because these phrases have not been given conclusive definitions,
different scholars and environmental organizations have designated their own meanings for
them. This has led to much ambiguity in the field.22 Seeking to remedy this issue, in 2000 the
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released a definition for the term “environmental
justice,” which is reprinted below:
The goal of environmental justice is to ensure that all people, regardless of race, national
origin or income, are protected from disproportionate impacts of environmental hazards.
To be classified as an environmental justice community, residents must be a minority
and/or low income group; excluded from the environmental policy setting and/or
decision-making process; subject to a disproportionate impact from one or more
environmental hazards; and experience a disparate implementation of environmental
regulations, requirements, practices and activities in their communities.23
While some members of the environmental justice community were pleased to finally have an
official definition, others believed it was too technical. At this time, the latter group advocated
for environmental justice in cases that were not directly based in environmental science, such as
indigenous land rights. As the EPA’s definition focused on more scientific issues, primarily
pollution, many activists felt as though the definition of environmental justice should be
broadened to include social issues in addition to scientific ones. The EPA has since amended
their definition, which currently reads, “Environmental justice is the fair treatment and
meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income, with
respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws,
regulations, and policies.”24 Despite this change, some critics believe that a precise definition for
environmental justice is impossible to find, as the term can encompass different meanings

_and_Environmental_Racism/links/5694093108ae425c6896255b/D efining-Environmental-Justice-andEnvironmental-Racism.pdf.
23
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24
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depending on the situation.25 While I concur that the significance of the phrase can change based
on the context, the current EPA definition for environmental justice is broad enough for the
purposes of this thesis and will be the point of reference whenever the term is used.
The phrase “environmental racism” contains even more ambiguity than “environmental
justice,” as the government has never given an official definition for the former.26 However, Rev.
Benjamin Chavis, who originated the term in the 1980s, has defined it as:
Environmental racism is racial discrimination in environmental policy-making and
enforcement of regulations and laws, the deliberate targeting of communities of color for
toxic waste facilities, the official sanctioning of the presence of life threatening poisons
and pollutants for communities of color, and the history of excluding people of color
from leadership of the environmental movement.27
This definition has caused some controversy within the environmental activism community,
particularly the phrase “deliberate targeting.” This choice of words has led some to believe that
in order for a case to be considered an example of environmental racism, malicious intent of
those responsible for the pollution must be proven. Conversely, others believe that this intent is
irrelevant, and that any system that places environmental burdens on people of color is inherently
racist.28 I agree with the latter interpretation, and will be using this lens when referring to
environmental racism in this thesis. However, it is important to note that the above definition
only views environmental racism within the context of various types of pollution. I firmly
believe that this definition should be broaden to include a plethora of environmental issues,
including responses to natural disasters such as hurricanes. Therefore, I will apply the framework
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of environmental racism throughout this paper in an effort to prove that the term can and should
be applied to other environmental situations.
As these phrases have been appropriately clarified, it is also necessary to highlight the
research that supports them. Since the 1980s, numerous studies have been completed in order to
verify the existence of environmental racism.29 Hundreds of statistics were collected, and nearly
all of them supported the idea that the burden of environmental pollution tends to fall on people
of color, while white people reap the benefits of the processes that cause such contamination.
Excellent examples of such disparities are found in the groundbreaking research of EPA
enforcement of its Superfund Sites.30 Conducted by The National Law Journal, this study
contains several staggering statistics. For instance, it was found that sites near the largest
population of whites were penalized 500% higher than sites near the largest population of people
of color. In addition, it was stated that “[f]or minority sites, EPA chooses ‘containment’, the
capping or walling off of a hazardous waste site, 7% more frequently than the cleanup method
preferred under the law: permanent ‘treatment’ to eliminate waste or rid it of its toxins. For white
sites, EPA orders permanent treatment 22% more often than containment.”31 This data is only a
small portion of an immense collection that shows a prejudice against minority communities in
terms of pollution; yet there are still critics who claim that this increased amount of toxic
exposure exhibited by the data could simply be due to class instead of race.32 However, this
theory has been disproven time and time again by research. In fact, most studies take into
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account both poverty and race and have proven that race is a stronger determining factor.33
Sociologist Robert D. Bullard has identified three categories that are violated when
environmental racism occurs. The first of these concepts is Procedural Equality, which is defined
as the unprejudiced application of government regulation and enforcement.34 The
aforementioned example of Superfund sites would be considered a violation of this category, as
regulations were not followed equally between white communities and communities of color.
The second violated principle is Geographic Equality, which refers to an equal distribution of
toxic waste hazards and other areas of pollution. It has been demonstrated through numerous
pieces of data that these pollutants are significantly more prevalent in communities of color than
in predominantly white areas.35 According to a report from Greenpeace, communities that
possess incinerators are 89% more populated with people of color than the national average.36
The final category of violation is Social Equality. This is simply the idea that by committing acts
of environmental racism, the government or corporations are relegating people of color to a
lesser position in society.37
Based on the definitions outlined above, it is evident that the people of Puerto Rico were
victims of environmental racism during the aftermath of Hurricane Maria. As will be
demonstrated in the following two chapters, Puerto Rican officials were given very little say in
the legislation and policy for various political procedures, including those related to disaster
relief. As a result, a disproportionate amount of harm befell island residents, particularly when
compared with those who were affected by Hurricanes Harvey and Irma on the mainland.
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Finally, as the health and infrastructural impact of the storm was felt for a much more extended
period of time in Puerto Rico than in other parts of U.S. affected by hurricanes, such as Texas or
Florida, it is clear that United States government willfully neglected Puerto Rico during and after
the natural disaster, which should certainly be classified as a case of environmental racism. The
following chapter will examine the contentious history between Puerto Rico and the U.S., and
how this complicated relationship foreshadowed the events during and after Hurricane Maria.
Chapter 3. Quasi-Colonialism: A History of Puerto Rican-U.S. Relations
While it may seem as if the aftermath of Hurricane Maria caused a rift between Puerto
Rico and the United States, in reality the storm only increased the strain in a relationship which
has always been contentious. Since Christopher Columbus landed on the island in 1493, Puerto
Rico has consistently remained a colony of other nations and has yet to have been given full
license to rule itself.3839 It continued under Spanish rule for the next 400 years until the United
States invaded the island on July 25th, 1898, toward the end of the Spanish-American War. Soon
after, Puerto Rico became the “political ward” of the U.S.; however, this turn of events was not
part of the American government’s initial plans for the war.40 Although the U.S. had entered into
the war over disagreements concerning Spain’s rule of Cuba, the smaller island of Puerto Rico
began to catch the eyes of key political figures in the months before the invasion.41As one of its
primary exports was sugar, American politicians believed control over the island would allow
them wean themselves off of their dependency on other nations for the crop.42 In addition, Puerto

“Puerto Rico,” Yale University Genocide Studies Program, n.d. Accessed November 4th, 2018.
Pedro A. Cabán, Constructing a Colonial People: Puerto Rico and the United States, 1898-1932 (Boulder,
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40
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Rico’s location in the Caribbean piqued the interests of naval expansionists, who had been
tirelessly searching for a way to expand their influence in a region exclusively held by European
powers.43 Beyond these political interests, much of the American public viewed themselves as
liberators and believed that they were rescuing Puerto Rico from the archaic monarchal system
imposed upon them by Spain. Because of this notion, the American people did not view the
invasion of Puerto Rico as colonialization. However, it was clear to Puerto Ricans in the 19th
century as well as most modern scholars that the territorial acquisitions that the United States
attained during the Spanish-American War, including that of Puerto Rico, signaled its transition
from fledgling nation into an imperial power.44
The United States’ unfamiliarity with the procedure of colonization is evident when
looking at its early reign in Puerto Rico. After officially becoming the sovereign of Puerto Rico
due to the Treaty of Paris in 1898, the U.S. rolled out a string of harsh policies for the island,
including censorship of the press.45 In addition, the United States government engaged in a
process deemed “Americanization,” which consisted of changing the political and judicial
structure in Puerto Rico in order to implement democratic principles.46 However, the results were
less than desirable for both parties; as much of the legislation enacted during this time was based
on American institutions and values, it did not function well in Puerto Rico. This left Puerto
Rican citizens feeling understandably dissatisfied with their government. Less than two years
after the initial invasion of the U.S., Puerto Rican political figures formally demanded territorial
status from Congress.47 In addition to the overall frustration felt by Puerto Rican citizens toward
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the U.S. government, the reasons behind their status request were twofold. First, Puerto Rico was
to be included in the U.S. tariff system in order to expand the island’s economy. Second, they
believed that the upgrade to territorial status would symbolize a promise from the U.S. for
eventual statehood, which was the ultimate goal for many Puerto Ricans.48 While this may sound
like a rather reasonable request, it launched Congress into a polarizing battle over the reach of
the Constitution. If Puerto Rico was to be granted territorial status, this would also suggest that
they would be given the constitutional rights endowed to all Americans, including citizenship.
While this idea was supported by the majority of Democrats in Congress, it was firmly rejected
by the Republicans, who believed that the Constitution did not necessarily apply to areas that the
United States had conquered.49 In addition to these differences in political ideologies, racist
attitudes were another unfortunate aspect of the territorial debate. During this era, many
politicians subscribed to the philosophy of Anglo-Saxon superiority, and were not hesitant to
apply it to the situation in Puerto Rico and elsewhere. Both Democrats and Republicans
recognized that any changes made to the status of Puerto Rico would also have to be applied to
the Philippines, another U.S. acquisition from the Spanish-American War. Some politicians were
in favor of granting citizenship to Puerto Ricans, due to the fact that much of the population was
considered to be white. However, they fiercely opposed the idea of Filipino people obtaining
citizenship, as they were people of color and therefore, in the eyes of certain congressmen,
unwanted in the United States.50 In addition, there were a group of congressmen who did not
wish to let either group of people gain citizenship simply due to their race. Democratic Senator
George Gilbert voiced his opinion on the matter when he declared, “‘I am opposed to increasing
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the opportunities for the millions of Negros in Puerto Rico and the 10,000,000 Asiatics in the
Philippines of becoming American citizens and swarming into this country and coming in
competition with our famers and mechanics and laborers.’”51 Despite the multitude of opinions,
Congress eventually reached a decision on the status of Puerto Rico. Through the Foraker Act,
Puerto Rico became the first unincorporated territory of the United States in 1900.52
Although at first glance this resolution might have looked like a victory for Puerto Rico,
in actuality the U.S. benefitted much more from its passing. The status of “unincorporated
territory” was specifically designed to appease the people of Puerto Rico whilst still denying
them U.S. citizenship or protection under the Constitution.53 It addition, it allowed the United
States to set up a government on the island in which Puerto Ricans themselves could have little
involvement. This new system mainly consisted of a governor and the Executive Council, the
latter of which had the majority of the control over the island.54 For the first half of the 20th
century, the members of the executive council as well as the governor were appointed by the
U.S. government.55 This became increasingly problematic, particularly due to the fact that the
majority of these political leaders were unwilling to learn the language or the culture of the
people they were serving. One notable exception was Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., who served as
governor of Puerto Rico from 1929-1932.56 Roosevelt was openly critical of his predecessors as
well as his contemporaries, once stating, “Most of the men who filled executive positions in
Puerto Rico were there from the United States, with no previous experience whatsoever,
speaking not a word of Spanish. Most of them had no conception either of Spanish culture or
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temperament. Most of them never learned to speak Spanish fluently, and many of them never
learned to speak Spanish at all.”57 Naturally, this communicative barrier immensely hindered the
members of the Executive Council from effectively serving the islanders. Because the majority
of Puerto Ricans did not begin to learn English until the 1930s, neither the politicians nor the
people of Puerto Rico could communicate with one another. This led to the members of the
Executive Council to base all of their policy decisions of input from American residents of the
island, despite the fact that they were the overwhelming minority.58 Due to this turn of events,
the people of Puerto Rican now lacked representation on the island their ancestors had called
home for centuries. In addition, they were unable to govern themselves yet were not granted
citizenship to the nation which ruled their governing body. This tragic reality led one democratic
congressman to remark, “‘[The Puerto Rican is] a man without a country. Can any man conceive
of a more tyrannical form of government?”59
Despite U.S. politicians’ ambivalence toward their culture, Puerto Ricans received a
considerable political advancement in the form of the Jones Act of 1917. This piece of legislation
finally granted Puerto Ricans U.S. citizenship, thereby realizing a dream that many islanders had
since the U.S.’ invasion almost 20 years prior.60 In addition to citizenship, the act also gave
Puerto Rico a limited amount of power to govern itself. 61 While this legislation may appear
beneficial for the people of Puerto Rico, it was instead both a cultural and political hindrance for
those who wished to maintain their Puerto Rican identity. Since the islanders were officially
American citizens, the concept of Puerto Rican citizenship ceased to exist.62 Whether intentional
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or not, this was yet another example of the U.S. government stripping Puerto Ricans of their
cultural identity. In addition, those who wished for Puerto Rican independence were also
displeased by the act, as it signaled a deeper, more complex attachment to the United States that
would make complete autonomy much more challenging to obtain.63 But perhaps the most
frustrating aspect of the Jones Act was that despite the fact that the islanders were now U.S.
citizens, they were not guaranteed the constitutional rights that citizens on the mainland enjoyed.
Instead, the act contained a modified Bill of Rights that gave Puerto Ricans only a fraction of the
liberties compared to those held by U.S. citizens.64 For instance, while the islanders were given
the ability to vote for a single representative in Congress, this delegate was not permitted to vote
on any issue brought to the floor. Limitations such as these left many Puerto Ricans feeling
unrepresented and undervalued in the new nation to which they supposedly belonged.65
Tensions between the territory and the United States continued throughout the next
decade and were only exacerbated when Puerto Rico was plunged further into poverty during the
1930s. Interestingly, this was mainly due to a major hurricane that ripped through the island in
1929 and destroyed many of the crops on which the Puerto Rican economy depended.66
Although Governor Roosevelt Jr. attempted to raise awareness in the U.S. of the plight the
islanders were facing, legislative officials did little to nothing to alleviate this immense poverty.
In fact, it was not until Roosevelt Jr.’s distant cousin, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, took office as
president that a major figure in U.S. politics attempted to provide some relief to Puerto Rico.
Roosevelt himself received much of the information about the status of the islanders from his
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wife, Eleanor.67 Her interest was piqued after a visit to the territory in 1934, where she witnessed
the truly terrible conditions that some of the island’s poorest residents were forced to endure.
Deeply affected by this experience, Eleanor continued to monitor the situation from the States
and reported her findings to her husband, who subsequently became much more knowledgeable
than his forbears about living conditions in Puerto Rico.68 It was because of this noticeable
interest in the welfare of the island that many believed that Roosevelt’s New Deal would offer
some relief to struggling Puerto Ricans. However, due to oppositions about implementing the
plan from Congress as well as the Puerto Rican government, the New Deal was not put into
effect on the island.69
The relationship between the U.S. and its unincorporated territory failed to improve as
the 1930s progressed; by the middle of the decade, Puerto Ricans belonging to both Liberal and
Republican parties were supportive of independence.70 A revolt seemed eminent, as the majority
of islanders were distrusting of the U.S. government and uprisings and demonstrations led by the
Nationalist party heightened the demand for independence. Due to these sentiments voiced by
the Puerto Rican public, Senator Millard Tydings proposed a bill that would have allowed Puerto
Rico to vote on its independence. While such a vote was debated greatly on the island, local
legislators ultimately decided that ties to the United States were still necessary in order to lift
Puerto Rico out of poverty, and thus the vote never came to fruition.71
Surprisingly, the threat of mutiny that seemed to loom over the island in the 1930s
seemed to all but fizzle out during the next decade. According to author Raymond Carr, the
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period of 1941-1948 was the final phase of classic colonialism in Puerto Rico.72 During this
time, the Puerto Rican economy was stimulated by revenue from World War II as well as the
booming rum business, which was then used to set up new industries on the island.73 The rather
rapid improvement of the economy signaled the beginning of a “peaceful revolution” in Puerto
Rico. Residents of the island began to engage more with their own politics beyond the call for
independence.74 Due to demand for soldiers, migration within the island from rural to urban
areas increased and the territory was modernized as a result. As scores of able-bodied men left
home to fight in the war, Puerto Rican women stepped up to take their place in the workforce.75
However, to say that the industrialization of the island was solely propelled by Puerto Rican
residents would be misguided. In reality, private American investors funded a significant amount
of new businesses on the island in the post-war era. This sudden boom was due to an agreement
with Congress, which stated that companies that were founded and operated in Puerto Rico were
not required to pay local taxes for the first decade of their existence.76 This incentive revealed
itself to be quite the double-edged sword; while it undoubtedly aided Puerto Rican economic
prosperity, the agreement also further entangled the island with the United States. In addition to
the economy, progressive beliefs concerning the fate of the island territory also flourished in
U.S. during this period; in 1943, a presidential committee proposed that Puerto Rico should be
allowed to elect its own governor.77 This led to the Elected Governor Act in 1946, the same year
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that Jesús T. Piñero, the first governor of Puerto Rican descent, was appointed.78 Two years later,
Luís Muñoz Marín became the first elected governor of the island.79
While the 1940s were a period of relative peace in the territory, the political and
economic gains made by Puerto Rico during this time did little to placate citizens’ underlying
desire for independence. Soon after the end of World War II, residents of the island called for the
United States to begin the process of decolonization. Congress, however, was wholly unwilling
to discuss the matter; legislators claimed they were too preoccupied with the impending Cold
War to even consider the topic of Puerto Rican independence.80 Newly elected governor Muñoz
Marín was tasked with finding a compromise with the United States that allowed Puerto Rico to
distance itself politically while still maintaining its economic relationship that had caused the
island to prosper tremendously.81 His solution came in the form of an entirely new state-territory
hybrid known as a “commonwealth.” While this term had previously been used in the technical
names of four U.S. states, as well as several British territories, the conditions devised by Muñoz
Marín of the updated relationship between the United States and its territory would be
completely unique to Puerto Rico.82 According to Muñoz Marín’s vision, the Puerto Rican
government would be allowed to write its own constitution, which would then be approved by
Congress.83 Such a measure would finally grant Puerto Ricans significant control over their own
laws and was more closely aligned to the legislative process of the states than the system that
Puerto Rico had been subjugated to since the Jones Act of 1917.
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As residents of the island were still split in the debate of independence versus statehood,
there was plenty of criticism of Muñoz Marín’s commonwealth plan. The primary concern was
that this concept was simply a new name for the existing relationship between Puerto Rico and
the U.S., and little would actually improve in the way of Puerto Rican autonomy.84 This
apprehension was not without merit; the House Committee Report on the Commonwealth Bill
stated that “this bill under consideration would not change Puerto Rico’s fundamental political
social and economic [sic] relationships with the United States.”85 Puerto Ricans were given the
opportunity to voice their opinions about the proposed commonwealth when a referendum
occurred on August 30th, 1950.86 Nationalists, who strongly opposed the idea of Puerto Rico as a
commonwealth, staged protests that quickly turned violent as 27 people died as a result.87
Despite the Nationalists’ fervent attempts to dissuade the public from the Commonwealth, the
referendum passed with just over 75% of the vote in favor.88 However, this statistic alone does
not paint an accurate picture of the level of Puerto Rican support the Commonwealth received. It
was revealed shortly after the referendum that on 65.08% of eligible Puerto Ricans voted, which
meant that only 49.76% of voters demonstrated approval for the Commonwealth.89 These figures
clearly demonstrate that the idea of a commonwealth was still an immensely divisive issue on the
island in the early 1950s, much more so than the initial referendum results would lead one to
believe.

84

Carr, 77.
Ibid.
86
Carr, 78.
87
José Trías Monge, Puerto Rico: The Trials of the Oldest Colony in the World, (New Haven, Connecticut:
Yale University Press, 1997), 113-114.
88
Carr, 78.
89
Ibid.
85

21
Puerto Rico’s status was officially changed from unincorporated territory to
Commonwealth on July 25th, 1952, 54 years to the day of the United States’ invasion.90 In
Spanish, Puerto Rico’s new title was translated to “Estado Libre Asociado”, or Associated Free
State. While this term was created to emphasize the island’s supposed newfound agency in their
relationship with the United States,91 the different connotations that can be derived from this title
versus those of the English one serve as an excellent metaphor for the different expectations each
party had of the new agreement. Soon after the Commonwealth system was implemented, it
began to show its weaknesses. Federal agencies still imposed their domain on the island, and
without the power to appoint these employees. Puerto Rico had little say in their activities.92 The
main issue of the Commonwealth title was that neither side was certain of what liberties it
entailed. The vague wording of its bill made it nearly impossible to concretely define its status in
legislative terms.93 In some instances, Puerto Rico was given powers similar to that of a state,
while in others it was only relegated to territory status.94 The change in status did allow the
Puerto Rican government to create their own constitution, which legislators began drafting
almost immediately after the passage of the referendum. The first draft contained a progressive
Bill of Rights that included benefits for pregnant women and the unemployed as well as free
education and the right to work for all. 95 Congress, claiming that such freedoms were not in line
with American traditions, refused to approve the draft and made significant edits.96 The failed
Puerto Rican Bill of Rights exemplifies the paradox that existed between the United States and
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the Commonwealth during this time; the former wanted the latter to adhere to its customs, yet
was unwilling to fully integrate it into the nation and offer it full political and economic
protection.
The island’s status became further muddled after a series of decolonization proceedings
at the United Nations in 1953. Puerto Rico initially petitioned the UN to begin the process, while
the United States staunchly objected, insisting it was solely their decision if or when
decolonization occurred. However, the U.S. eventually agreed, as they were extremely reluctant
that their current relationship with P.R. continued to be labeled as “colonial,” despite the fact that
they refused to grant the island practically any self-determining power.97 Throughout the
hearings, confusion continued over whether or not Puerto Rico should be considered a colony by
the UN due to the vague nature of its commonwealth status and the inability of the United States
and Puerto Rico to reach an agreement on its meaning.98 Despite this uncertainty, the UN
General Assembly eventually voted that they would cease to consider Puerto Rico as a “non-selfgoverning” entity.99 However, when examining the power the U.S. still wielded over the island,
this term is clearly an inaccurate way to refer to Puerto Rico; U.S. federal law was still in effect
in the Commonwealth, and any amendments to the Constitution drafted by the Puerto Rican
government had to be approved by Congress.
Criticism aimed at the ambiguity of the commonwealth status was steady from several
Puerto Rican parties throughout the 1950s, and as a result the United States-Puerto Rico
Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico was formed in the early 1960s.100 The Commission
was tasked with investigating the economic, political, and cultural implications of three potential
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options: independence, statehood, and a more clearly defined Commonwealth.101 The results of
the investigation concluded that while all three options were valid, there would be higher
economic consequences of statehood. This was due to the fact that Puerto Rico would have to
pay more federal taxes that it would receive federal aid, resulting in an $18 million difference per
year.102 The Commission stated that while Puerto Rico was not currently financially ready for
statehood, it would be by 1980, less than 20 years in the future.103 Satisfied by the thoroughness
of the report, the U.S. government approved for a plebiscite that would supposedly allow Puerto
Rican residents to determine the next steps of their relationship.104 However, each option relied
on the action of Congress, so none of them were even guaranteed to occur.105 This sense of
futility, combined with the fact that the FBI and CIA were both stationed on the island and could
therefore manipulate the results of vote, led the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP) to protest
the plebiscite and discourage its members from voting.106107 This decision greatly impacted the
results of the plebiscite, as the votes for independence polled at less than one percent.108
Meanwhile, the vote for a clearly-defined Commonwealth won with 60%, and statehood received
40% in addition to winning nine districts on the island.109
The notable amount of support received by the statehood option signaled a considerable
shift in political opinion in Puerto Rico. This was demonstrated yet again when the New
Progressive Party (PNP), which was in favor of statehood, won the governor’s seat in 1968.110

101

Carr, 84-86.
Carr, 87.
103
Carr, 88.
104
Trías Monge, 130.
105
Carr, 90.
106
Carr, 89
107
Trías Monge, 131.
108
Carr, 90-91.
109
Ibid.
110
Trías Monge, 130.
102

24
Shortly after, new governor Luis A. Ferré partnered with President Nixon to create a committee
to investigate the impact of Puerto Rico residents voting in presidential elections. While the
committee suggested that such a policy could be implemented successfully, nothing ever came of
it.111 By the 1970s, very little headway had been made in more precisely defining the island’s
commonwealth status. Because of this, discussions of a new compact between the United States
and Puerto Rico that would finally clarify the present relationship began in 1975.112 The
proposed compact was intended to grant the island a new set of powers, including the ability to
levy tariffs and determine its own minimum wage. In addition, it would also give Puerto Ricans a
right that they had been asking for since the beginning of the century: representation in both
houses of Congress. Finally, the compact would also ensure that federal laws would only apply
to Puerto Rico if they specifically mentioned the island, and Puerto Rico would have the power
to formally oppose any laws that they believed would not benefit the Commonwealth.113
Unfortunately, the compact was never realized due to several factors. First, the PNP retook the
governor’s seat in 1976, after briefly losing it to the Popular Democratic Party, who was in favor
of the preservation of the Commonwealth.114 As members of the PNP advocated for statehood,
they had no interest in redefining the compact. In addition, President Ford suddenly announced
intentions to create a bill for Puerto Rican statehood, and in doing so ignored the compact
recommendations completely. The bill did not make much progress in Congress, leaving Puerto
Rico’s status as ambiguous as before. 115 Because of these events, the Commonwealth failed to
improve in any meaningful way, thus rendering the results of the plebiscite useless. It is now
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evident that Congress did not act with the opinions of Puerto Rican voters in mind after the
plebiscite; the voting process was simply a way for the United States to justify its ownership of
the island under the guise of democracy.
The indifference to Puerto Rico’s vague status continued into the 1980s. During the case
Harris v. Rosario (1980), the Supreme Court declared that Puerto Rico was a “territory
belonging to the United States and [Congress] may treat Puerto Rico differently from the states
as long as there is a rational basis for its actions.”116 Despite this, there was also growing support
for the statehood movement, both on the island and the mainland. Both George H.W. Bush and
Ronald Reagan supported statehood during the 1980 presidential election,117 and PNP candidate
Pedro Rosselló won the gubernatorial election in the early 1990s.118 Energized by this response,
the new governor ordered a second status plebiscite in 1993. While statehood again lost to
preserving the Commonwealth, the margins were much closer this time. The Commonwealth
won with 823,258 votes and statehood received 785,859 votes, giving the two options a two
percent difference.119 As 73.6% of the voting population showed up to the polls,120 it is clear that
more and more Puerto Ricans were becoming increasingly vocal of their preference for the more
just and defined relationship of statehood. Roselló continued his platform of statehood
throughout his gubernatorial career; one of his principle initiatives while in office was advancing
legislation that would foster statehood.121 Although it seemed as if the PNP was making headway
in their efforts to gain statehood status, the party suffered a significant blow at the end of the
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decade due to a series of consecutive corruption scandals that ended with the incarceration of
several prominent PNP mayors and legislators.122 Due the widespread misconduct occurring in
the party, the PNP lost the 2000 gubernatorial election, and PPD candidate Sila Calderón served
in the position for the next four years. During this time, Calderón failed to effect any significant
amount of change, and the quest for statehood from the PNP remained at bay.123
The two most recent referendums regarding the status of Puerto Rico have demonstrated
a noticeable shift in voter opinion. Another referendum was not held until 2012, 14 years after
the 1998 plebiscite. This poll saw a change in ballot formatting, as voters were asked to voice
their opinion on two questions: 1) Should Puerto Rico remain an unincorporated territory of the
United States, and 2) If not, what should its new status be?124 For the first time in history, the
majority of Puerto voters did not choose to remain an unincorporated territory, as 54% of voters
selected “No” for the first question. As for the second part of the referendum, voters could
choose between the options of statehood, free associated state, and complete independence; 61%
selected the first option.125 In 2017, another status referendum was held, this time with
astounding results: 97% of voters chose statehood out of the aforementioned three options.126
However, this special election has been heavily criticized; due to boycotts by the independence
movement and the PPD, only 23% of island residents voted and the results were certainly
skewed. Nevertheless, this small percentage consists of about 500,000 of the island’s residents.
127
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residents wish to for their island to receive full statehood. After the 2012 referendum, official
statements for both the Democratic and Republican Party expressed support for any decision that
Puerto Rican voters expressed.128 Yet despite this supposed approval, no changes to Puerto
Rico’s status appear to be in the foreseeable future.
Chapter 4. Disaster Politics
In order to fully understand the shortcomings of the United States government’s response
to Hurricane Maria, it is imperative to have some background knowledge on the departments and
policies the federal government has created in order to provide relief for natural disasters. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was established in 1979 by President Jimmy
Carter.129 The agency was absorbed by the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, although
it still retains its own name as well as the title of “agency.”130 According to its official
government website, FEMA is responsible for the preparation and prevention of all disasters
(natural or man-made) that occur on U.S.-owned soil. In addition, it is also supposed to alleviate
the severity of such disasters through its relief efforts. In 1988, Public Law 100-707 established
the current system under which FEMA operates today; once the president declares a state of
emergency, the agency is required to responded physically as well as financially. The nation and
its territories are divided into regions that each have a separate FEMA office. Puerto Rico is part
of Region II, which also includes the U.S. Virgin Islands, New York, and New Jersey.
While it would be beneficial to compare FEMA’s responses to previous hurricanes and
other natural disasters that have previously occurred in Puerto Rico, a lack of available
information makes this a challenging task. In the 40 years of FEMA’s existence, only two
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disasters occurred before Hurricane Maria that caused significant damage: Hurricane Hugo in
1989 and Hurricane Georges in 1998. From all available accounts, it appears that FEMA
provided a sufficient amount of water, shelter, and electricity to Puerto Rican residents during
the aftermath of Georges.131 This information is not available for Hurricane Hugo. Additionally
the amount of financial assistance that both FEMA and the federal government awarded to
Puerto Rico in either circumstance is unavailable; as each storm caused nearly $2 billion in
damage, this information is necessary in order to fully evaluate the success of FEMA and the
United States government in properly addressing these natural disasters. Furthermore, it is more
relevant to compare FEMA’s response to Hurricane Maria to those of Hurricanes Harvey and
Irma; all three occurred within the same hurricane season, yet the latter two yielded a response
from FEMA and the federal government that was drastically than their reaction to the former.
Hurricane Maria made landfall to Puerto Rico a little over a month after Hurricane
Harvey hit Texas and Hurricane Irma hit Florida and the U.S. Virgin Islands. As a result, FEMA
was tasked with responding to three natural disasters simultaneously, which is certainly not an
easy feat. However, when one compares the statistics of FEMA’s responses in each location,
there is a glaring disparity between the level of financial and material relief that Puerto Rico
received versus those that were received by Florida and Texas. In order to accurately compare
FEMA’s responses to these natural disasters, it is important to note that the three hurricanes in
question were not the same level of severity. While Harvey and Irma were classified as Category
4 hurricanes, Maria was considered a “high-end” Category 4 hurricane, or almost as severe as a
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Category 5 storm.132 Additionally, Maria caused more power outages and structural damage than
either Harvey or Irma.133 The most evident statistical disproportion among the three storms was
their mortality rates. Hurricane Harvey caused a total of 113 deaths, both directly and indirectly,
while Hurricane Irma was responsible for 84 deaths in Florida as well as an additional 8 deaths
in the Caribbean.134 Meanwhile, 2,975 deaths have been attributed to Hurricane Maria.135
This increased level of destruction experienced by Puerto Rico in comparison to Texas
and Florida did not translate to a higher portion of FEMA’s financial, material, or labor
resources. In reality, Puerto Rico often received less aid in many categories when compared to
Florida and Texas. This pattern can be detected from the first acts of response all the way to
Congress’ financial assistance authorizations. After Hurricane Maria hit, 10,000 FEMA
personnel were deployed to Puerto Rico,136 with the total number of employees on the island
rising to 19,000 at the height of relief efforts.137 The amount of FEMA employees that responded
to the hurricanes in Florida and Texas were 22,000 and 30,000, respectively,138 with a total
31,000 personnel in Texas at the height of relief efforts.139 There was also a significant
imbalance between the three affected areas in terms of materials that FEMA supplied. Within the
first nine days after Hurricane Maria hit, FEMA handed out 2.8 million leaders of water to
Puerto Ricans.140 While this certainly sounds like a great deal of water, it is a relatively small
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amount when compared to the 4.5 million liters distributed in Texas and 7 million liters
distributed in Florida within the same time frame.141 Despite the elevated level of housing
damage that occurred on Puerto Rico, islanders only received 5,000 tarps from FEMA; Texans
were bestowed 20,000 while Floridians received nearly 100,000.142
To FEMA’s credit, the organization has since claimed partial responsibility for its poor
response to Hurricane Maria. In July of 2018, it published its After-Action report for the 2017
hurricane season.143 In this annual summary, FEMA admitted to being underprepared and
mishandling the aftermath of the storm.144 Due to the rapid succession of the three hurricanes,
FEMA’s emergency supply storage was nearly depleted when Maria made landfall. In addition
to the minimal amount of tarps that were distributed in Puerto Rico, another type of equipment
that was severely lacking was generators. While eventually providing Puerto Rican residents
with 2000 generators over the course of the power outages, FEMA only installed 31 generators
on the island the first day after the storm;145 as 1.5 million of the islanders lost electricity due to
the storm, this amount of generators was nowhere near sufficient.146 The organization continued
to face complications while attempting to reconnect the island to the power grid in the months
following Hurricane Maria; 3 months after the storm, only 65% of power had been restored in
Puerto Rico, compared to 90% in the Virgin Islands.147 According to FEMA officials, this
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disparity can be partially attributed to the fact that the U.S. Virgin Islands’ infrastructure is more
modern and better-functioning than the infrastructure in Puerto Rico.148 Additionally, the
government had taken further alleviation efforts in the U.S. Virgin Islands than in Puerto Rico,
which greatly aided in the electricity recovery process.149 FEMA’s relief efforts overall were
hindered due to the outdated electric, transportation, and communication infrastructure on the
island. In fact, a great of bridges, roads, and sewer systems in Puerto Rico are over 50 years old,
and could not be repaired after the storm because many of their parts are not currently being
manufactured.150 Finally, the agency’s personnel underestimated the amount of satellite phones
to bring with them to the island, meaning they had practically no reliable way to communicate
amongst themselves or with supply delivery coordinators.151These hardships were a clear
oversight by FEMA as well as the federal government and easily could have been prevented if
the latter had invested in updating the island’s infrastructure. Another shortage that FEMA
suffered were available employees. According to their own report, the organization experienced
significant staffing shortages during Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria.152 In addition, many of
those who were sent to aid in relief efforts appear to have not been qualified; almost 40% of
FEMA employees assigned to Puerto Rico lacked what the organization deems “disaster
workforce certification.”153
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While FEMA has acknowledged the aforementioned oversights, officials employed in the
organization continually blame the severity of the storm; Laura Sullivan, a correspondent for
NPR, stated about these claims:
FEMA has repeatedly insisted for months that the delays and the slow response was a
product of the storm itself. Michael Byrne, the federal coordinating officer for Maria, told
me if there's a villain here, it's the 190-mile-an-hour winds and the 50 inches of rain. And
what [The FEMA After-Action Report found] is that that's not entirely true.154
Indeed, FEMA’s own report notes that the agency knew even before Hurricane Maria hit
the island that it was going to cause widespread damage.155 In addition, the organization has
completed nine preparedness exercises since 2009 for disasters specific to Puerto Rico and the
U.S. Virgin Islands.156 From these assessments, FEMA had previously determined that the island
would need “significant federal intervention.”157 Given these facts, it is extremely puzzling why
the agency was so underprepared for Hurricane Maria. The timing of Hurricanes Harvey and
Irma is not an adequate excuse, as the organization clearly had information should have
prevented them from redirecting their Puerto Rican supplies in the midst of hurricane season.
FEMA’s behavior once again demonstrates that federal agencies do not view Puerto Rico and its
residents with the same amount of respect as they do with other U.S. citizens and fail to treat
island-related disasters with an appropriate level of urgency as a result.
While there were clear differences between the material and labor resources Puerto Rico
received from the government compared to those received by Texas and Florida, the starkest
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discrepancy between the treatment of these relief efforts is evident when examining the financial
assistance each received. In Florida, survivors of Hurricane Irma were awarded a combined $100
million within the first nine days of the storm. Texans were compensated the same amount
within nine days after Hurricane Harvey made landfall. 158 However, this pattern does not
continue in Puerto Rico, as survivors of Hurricane Maria were only awarded a little over $6
million total within the first nine days after the storm.159 This trend of Puerto Rico receiving less
money than their state counterparts continued when Congress created three bills intended to
provide financial assistance in the wake of these natural disasters. The first bill was approved in
September 2017 and allocated $15.25 billion to Hurricane Harvey and Hurricane Irma aid.
Additionally, it gave $7.4 billion to FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund, $7.4 billion to the Depart of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD)’s Community Development Block Grant, and $450
million to the Small Business Administration (SBA)’s Disaster Loans Program Account.160 As
this bill was approved before Hurricane Maria hit, it is perfectly reasonable that Puerto Rico did
not receive any of this funding. 161However, the subsequent two bills were created in the months
after Hurricane Maria and still failed to award Puerto Rico the financial assistance it desperately
needed. In October 2017, the second bill authorized an additional $18.67 billion for FEMA’s
Disaster Relief Fund; this amount was to be used for relief for all three hurricanes. This bill also
awarded Puerto Rico $4.9 billion in relief aid.162 Not only was this amount significantly smaller
than the combined total that Texas and Florida received, but it was also structured in the form of
a community disaster loan, which meant that Puerto Rico would be obligated to repay the federal
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government. This was in contrast to the money awarded to Texas and Florida, which were
considered grants and therefore repayment was not required. 163 However, Congress denied the
loan to Puerto Rico in early January 2018, citing the island’s high amount of debt.164 Legislators
seemed to change their mind again when they released another bill, created in December 2017
but not signed into effect until February 2018, directed the Puerto Rican government to create
two hurricane recovery plans: one that would last the duration of a year and another that would
last for two years. In order to receive the loan proposed in the last bill, the government of Puerto
Rico was required to send monthly updates to Congress detailing their progress. Meanwhile,
neither Texas nor Florida were required to complete such a program to receive their funding. 165
From the examples that these three bills provide, it is evident that legislators have been blatantly
ignoring the severity of the damage inflicted by Hurricane Maria, particularly in comparison to
the lesser destruction that Hurricanes Harvey and Irma caused. In addition, Congress failed to
take into account that the population of Puerto Rico was significantly more disadvantaged than
citizens affected on the mainland, both in terms of economic stability as well as level of
health.166 The next chapter will discuss how the health statistics that existed in Puerto Rico made
residents particularly vulnerable during the natural disaster, as well as the medical issues that
occurred after the storm as a result of the U.S. government’s negligence.
Chapter 5. A Perfect Storm: Public Health Crises during Hurricane Maria
Among the most urgent issues that were created by Hurricane Maria were various
concerns surrounding Puerto Rico’s public health. While a myriad of these dilemmas occurred
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specifically after the storm, many of them had originated before Maria made landfall.167 Because
of this, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of the public health challenges faced by a
pre-Maria Puerto Rico.
For the last several years, Puerto Rico’s health statistics have been drastically different
than that of the mainland United States, with Puerto Rico consistently maintaining higher
percentages of medical conditions within its population. For example, the most recent data
before Hurricane Maria demonstrated that 15.4% of Puerto Rican residents were living with a
disability, compared to 8.6% in the United States.168 In addition, it has been reported that the
island has the highest rate of premature births of any state or territory belonging to the U.S.169
Diabetes rates have also soared in Puerto Rico, as they are 50% higher than those in the United
States. However, perhaps the most shocking statistic is that the death rate due to diabetes is three
times higher than that in the United States. A similar trend follows in HIV death rates, with are
four times as higher in the former region than the latter.170 These rather large disparities may be
seem surprising at first glance, given Puerto Rico’s territorial association with the U.S. However,
it is precisely this relationship that allows for the island to operate under different health and
economic policies than the mainland.
These differences can clearly be seen in the distribution and funding of healthcare. Due to
its territorial status, Puerto Rico is bound to a statutory cap on Medicaid, meaning that the island
has a set amount of annual federal funds that are channeled toward this program. As 49% of
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Puerto Rican residents relied on Medicaid before the storm, this created significant pressure on
the island’s government to properly distribute this federal aid. Meanwhile, none of the 50 states
nor the District of Columbia have such a cap, and together only 20% of their citizens rely on
Medicaid, a considerably smaller percentage than those in Puerto Rico. The latter’s dependence
on limited federal aid, coupled with the fact that only 35% of Puerto Rican residents receive
health insurance from their employers, has led many islanders to seek alternative means for
medical assistance. Community Health Centers (CHCs) are a heavily used resource in Puerto
Rico, providing service to over 350,000 residents before Hurricane Maria. Much like many of
their patients, all 93 CHCs on the island rely on Medicaid.171 They are mostly located in rural
areas, as these populations are tremendously underserved. These areas are known as “healthcare
provider shortage areas”, where only 32% of the need for physicians were satisfied in 2016. It is
estimated that approximately 19,000 people lived in these regions before the storm.172
The aforementioned public health issues that Puerto Rican residents experienced were
only aggravated when Hurricane Maria hit. Those with pre-existing medical conditions found it
nearly impossible to seek treatment in the weeks after the storm due to damaged infrastructure,
particularly in the areas of electricity, transportation, and communication. Three weeks after
Maria, a mere 392 out of 5,073 miles of road were operational in Puerto Rico. Almost two
months later, it was reported that 28% of residents had still not regained telecommunication
access.173 This devastation left many Puerto Ricans stranded and unable to communicate with the
outside world, which could have severe implications for those with pre-existing medical
conditions as well as those who were injured during the storm and could not receive necessary
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treatment. Furthermore, residents who were able to travel were still often unable to be seen by
medical professionals due to the severe damage inflicted on hospitals and clinics throughout the
island. After the storm, the majority of these medical sites suffered power outages, and many
were not equipped with generators to provide emergency electricity. Three days after Hurricane
Maria, only three out of the seventy hospitals in Puerto Rico were operational.174175 Two months
later, many hospitals had not seen much improvement, with approximately 40% of reporting
facilities stating that they still had not regained normal access to power and were relying on
generators. In addition to hospitals, other medical sites on the island suffered large losses of
power that hindered their ability to treat patients. For instance, ten of Puerto Rico’s community
health clinics were not operational a month after the hurricane. As many island residents who
receive Medicaid depend on these clinics for treatment, their inability to operate made it
extremely difficult for some Puerto Ricans to receive care, particularly if they lived in rural areas
and therefore had fewer treatment center options.176 In addition, the majority of Puerto Rico’s 47
dialysis centers were without power after the hurricane, and still required the use of generators
months later due to a lack of reliable access to electricity. Due to the high prevalence of diabetes
on the island, this was a significant impediment to the necessary treatment of many residents and
undoubtedly negatively impacted their health.177
While the structural damage caused by Hurricane Maria exacerbated the medical issues
faced by many Puerto Ricans, it also created a set of new public health concerns. After the storm,
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many islanders were unable to obtain fresh food on their own and were forced to depend on
donations from FEMA, the Red Cross, and other groups. These provisions were still occurring in
overwhelming numbers two months after Maria made landfall, with approximately one million
meals being given out per day. While it was certainly generous of these groups to donate this
food, the inability to access fresh food could potentially lead to malnutrition in many Puerto
Rican residents.178 As previously stated in chapter 1, many Puerto Ricans also had extreme
difficulties obtaining safe drinking water.179 This accessibility issue was due to the fact that
many water treatment stations were not functioning weeks after the storm hit. By midNovember, 91% of Puerto Rican residents had regained water access; while this is a vast
improvement, it still left approximately 300,000 Puerto Ricans with reliable access to potable
water.180 Sheer desperation led many residents to drink from natural sources such as ponds and
streams,181 and it and in the weeks after Hurricane Maria, rates for waterborne, communicable
diseases began to spike. In addition to the hundreds of cases of leptospirosis that were discussed
in chapter 1, reports of scabies, conjunctivitis, vomiting, diarrhea, and asthma increased on the
island in the months after the storm. There is a potential for these statistics to be even higher than
currently estimated, as proper assessment of cases was challenging due to damage of public
health labs on the island.182 Furthermore, scientists studying the groundwater on the island found
that one well in municipality of Dorado was sourcing water from an EPA Superfund site, which
was filled with various industrial chemicals. Due to the already high levels of premature births in
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Puerto Rico, researchers are concerned about the effect these chemicals might have on expectant
mothers and are currently investigating this relationship. Interestingly enough, some of these
scientists are completely funding these research projects themselves, as the National Institute of
Health denied their grant applications.183
In addition to the myriad of physical ailments Puerto Ricans suffered after Hurricane
Maria, the storm and its aftermath also triggered a plethora of mental health issues for many
island residents. Puerto Rican professionals have reported that the rate of mental health services
being sought on the island has greatly increased since the storm occurred. Depression and
anxiety are the most common issues listed by potential patients, including those who have not
reported experiencing these issues previously.184 Several mental health experts have asserted that
the storm exacerbated an already fragile mental health climate on the island. Years of economic
recession have been mentally taxing for many island residents,185 and the trauma from the storm
and the stress of recovering in its aftermath has pushed many residents “over the brink”,
according to psychologist Frances Boulon.186 While the Puerto Rico Psychology Association was
in the midst of developing an emergency mental health network for this type of crisis, it was not
functional when Hurricane Maria hit.187 This left health professionals unequipped to deal with
the needs of mental health patients in the aftermath of the storm, as many of their typical
resources were no longer available. Many of the island’s pharmacies were not operational during
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and after the storm, which made it impossible for people with existing mental health conditions
to access any antidepressants or antipsychotics they might have needed. In addition, many of
these patients were unable to seek professional help or attend their regular treatments due to
infrastructure damage as well as the lack of cell phone service on the island. These lack of
available treatment options had stark consequences for many islanders; shortly after the storm,
Puerto Rico’s suicide hotline recorded as many as 800 phone calls per day,188 and instances of
suicide have increased by 29% compared to those from before Hurricane Maria.189 Perhaps the
most frightening statistic is that island psychologists have recorded instances of suicidal thoughts
in children, many of whom said they were worried about their families’ future in the aftermath of
the storm.190
In addition to suicide rates, Puerto Ricans have faced a notable elevation in rates of PostTraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) since Hurricane Maria occurred. In early 2019,
epidemiologists from the University of Miami published a study that recorded symptoms of
PTSD in Puerto Rican adults who had been forced to relocate to Florida due to the storm, as well
as those who had remained on the island. According to their findings, 65.7% of the surveyed
Florida population had PTSD, compared to 43.6% of the surveyed population in Puerto Rico.191
While these percentages are both concerning, the disparity between the two demonstrates the
additional trauma that is experienced when an individual is displaced during a natural disaster.
High PTSD rates were recorded for Puerto Rican children as well as adults after the storm. One

188

Wyss.
Lybarger.
190
Wyss.
191
Carolina Scaramutti, Christopher P. Salas-Wright, Saskia R. Vos, et al, “The Mental Health Impact of
Hurricane Maria on Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico and Florida,” Disaster Medicine and Public Health
Preparedness 13, no. 1(2019): 24-27, accessed September 10th, 2019,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30696508.
189

41
study recorded 7.2% of surveyed children as exhibiting signs of PTSD; while this may seem like
a low statistic, the study evaluated 96,108 schoolchildren in 3rd-12th grade, meaning that just
under 7,000 of these children are experiencing symptoms of PTSD.192
Another mental health issue that has been aggravated due to Hurricane Maria is substance
abuse. After the storm hit, many pharmacists on the island became more lenient when filling
prescriptions, often not requiring a doctor’s signature. While this practice is obviously unethical
and illegal, many saw it as a form of charity, as residents who were injured as a result of the
hurricane were often unable to be seen by doctors and therefore get authorization for the
medication they needed.193 However, this act of goodwill backfired immensely, as many of these
prescriptions found their way to the black market. Puerto Rican health professionals are now
hypothesizing that this chain of events, combined with the increased reports of mental health
issues, are the main causes of a significant spike in fentanyl use on the island.194 A notable
increase in overdoses since Hurricane Maria has been reported, but it has been challenging for
coroners to definitively prove that these deaths were caused by fentanyl in particular due to
departmental budget cuts that have limited testing. While there have been 40 confirmed fentanyl
deaths as of March 2018, experts suspect that an additional 75 are linked to the drug.195 Although
the drug was present on the island before the storm, many experts believe that the increase of
homelessness that was caused by Maria has also played a role in the surging popularity of
fentanyl.196 Despite the fact that it is evident that Maria aggravated mental health and substance

192

Rosaura Orengo-Aguayo, Regan W. Stewart, Michael A. de Arellano, et. al., “Disaster Exposure and
Mental Health Among Puerto Rican Youths After Hurricane Maria,” JAMA Network Open 2, no. 4 (2019),
accessed September 10th, 2019, https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2731679.
193
Danica Coto, “Growing Opioid Crisis Adds to Puerto Rico’s Problems,” The Associated Press, January 7th,
2019, accessed September 10th, 2019, https://apnews.com/2636642b00e14f8b84f7e6e71a9ee1f7.
194
Ibid.
195
Ibid.
196
Wyss.

42
abuse issues in Puerto Rico, more research about the extent of its impact is needed. Fortunately,
the National Institute of Health awarded a team of researchers from Drexel’s Dornslife School of
Public Health $3.2 million to investigate the link between Maria and these mental health issues
in May of 2019.197
Each of the aforementioned public health issues faced by Puerto Rican citizens in the
wake of Hurricane Maria were either completely avoidable or could have been minimized had
proper intervention by the United States government occurred. While there are several clear
examples of governmental failures in this context, the most egregious and infamous of these was
undoubtedly the inaccurate reporting of Hurricane Maria’s mortality rate. Initial reports after the
hurricane stated that the death toll was as low as 16 people in Puerto Rico.198 Two weeks after
the storm hit, President Trump visited the island and maintained this figure during a press
conference.199 As the weeks progressed and more autopsies were conducted, The Puerto Rican
government continued to update this data until it arrived at its definitive, official statistic in
December 2017: 64 individuals died as a result of the storm.200 This number seemed incredibly
low to many of the residents of Puerto Rico, who had obviously witnessed an immense amount
of damage, injuries, and even fatalities at the hands of the storm. In addition, dozens of media
outlets who had been covering the natural disaster also questioned both the Puerto Rico and U.S.
governments’ motivations in releasing such a low death toll.201 While both the United States and
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its territory maintained that 64 was the official mortality rate, several publications began to
release their own estimates of the death toll,202 which were typically around 1,000.203 In February
2018, the government of Puerto Rico responded to this mounting criticism by authorizing an
independent study by George Washington University’s Milken Institute School of Public Health
and the University of Puerto Rico to determine an accurate death toll for Hurricane Maria.204
Before these researchers had completed their investigation, the New England Journal of
Medicine released a study from Harvard University that estimated that the actual death toll was
between 800 to over 8,000. Researchers attributed this rather large range to the fact that their
data came from household surveys.205 In August 2018, the researchers from George Washington
University published their findings. In order to obtain the accurate death toll from the storm,
researchers counted deaths on the island from September 2017 to February 2018 and subtracted
this figure from the average mortality during this time.206 Using this formula, researchers
determined that 2,975 excess deaths had occurred in Puerto Rico due to the hurricane. In addition
to calculating the death toll, this report also evaluated the death certification process that had
been employed in the midst of the disaster recovery. According to the George Washington
researchers, most of the physicians employed at the time did not receive proper training on the
creation of death certificates, specifically in disaster situations. Furthermore, power outages due
to the storm caused an average delay of 17 days for death registration.207 Researchers also
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attribute the issue to lack of communication between coroners and the Puerto Rican government.
Summarizing its assessment of the causes of death toll inaccuracy, the study states:
There were gaps in the information provided by the Government of Puerto Rico,
including limited explanation of the death certification process, distinguishing between
direct and indirect deaths, or explanations of barriers to timely mortality reporting.
Despite the potential for information gaps to increase the risk of the propagation of
misinformation and rumors, the Government of Puerto Rico did not systematically
monitor and address misinformation or rumors in news outlets and on social media
platforms.208
It is evident from the above statement that the Government of Puerto Rico clearly has
procedural issues that need to be addressed immediately. However, errors on the part of the
island territory do not acquit the United States government of their lack of adequate relief efforts.
Instead, these shortcomings on the part of Puerto Rico are yet another example of the perils of
the ambiguous status under which Puerto Rico currently falls; had they been obligated to comply
with U.S. regulations, perhaps these errors would not have occurred. Furthermore, President
Trump’s acceptance and perpetuation of these numbers demonstrate a remarkable amount of
indifference on the part of the United States government. Despite immense and continual
criticism from parties in Puerto Rico as well as on the mainland, White House officials only
relented on the death count when the results from the George Washington study emerged. It is
clear from this that the U.S. government only cared about their own optics, and showed little
sympathy toward Puerto Ricans who suffered injury, sickness, or the loss of a loved one due to
the storm.
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Chapter 6: Preventing the Next Maria
Based on the evidence offered in the preceding chapters, it is clear that Puerto Rico has
suffered from inequitable treatment by the United States government, which resulted in various
occurrences of injustice. As demonstrated by the complex history of the relationship between the
two regions outlined in chapter 3, the United States’ neglect of its territory is rooted in racism
and sentiments of superiority. While current prejudices upheld by government employees may
not be intentional, they remain intact nonetheless. Because of these attitudes, my
recommendations to ameliorate the situation can be divided into three categories: utilization of
grassroots movements in Puerto Rico, modification of Puerto Rico’s territorial status and
revision of FEMA’s response plan for the island and federal government relief spending. Making
these changes will hopefully prevent a similar situation of environmental racism from occurring
in Puerto Rico in the future.
In chapter 2 of this thesis, I noted that the current official definition of environmental
racism was limited to communities experiencing toxic pollution at disproportionate rates. Due to
the impending climate crisis, it is imperative that this definition be expanded to include
communities who experience inadequate government response to natural disasters. Broadening
this definition both officially and colloquially will give activists the grounds necessary to pursue
the proper avenues for environmental justice. Fortunately, there are currently several grassroots
movements working to improve conditions in areas affected by Hurricane Maria. The most
prominent of these organizations is the Climate Justice Alliance, which is based on the mainland
but partnering with several smaller Puerto Rican organizations, such as Organización Boricuá de
Agricultura Ecológica de Puerto Rico.209 Together, these groups have launched a movement
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called Our Power Puerto Rico Campaign that focuses on providing disaster relief in marginalized
communities.210 As the Climate Justice Alliance’s main focus is on assisting communities that
the federal government often neglects, the nation of Puerto Rico can certainly benefit from their
work. However, it would be advantageous if Puerto Rico had a strong network of environmental
justice organizations that were based on island and comprised of island residents. Fortunately,
this is likely to occur in the near future; much of Puerto Rico’s school-aged population, known as
“Generation Maria,” have been incentivized by their experiences in the storm’s aftermath to join
the fight against climate change.211 Hopefully, this generation will not only further the work of
U.S. grassroots movements on the island, but adopt them as their own and utilize their unique
perspectives as Puerto Rican residents to ensure that such negligence and injustice in the wake of
an environmental disaster never occurs on their island again.
As previously discussed in chapter 3, the governmental status of Puerto Rico has been
unnecessarily complex since its acquisition by the U.S. and is still convoluted today. Terms such
as commonwealth, unincorporated territory, and freely associated state are all part of the current
vernacular to describe Puerto Rico’s status, only adding to the confusion of the general public. In
addition, the failure of U.S. Congress to determine and disclose which constitutional rights do
not apply to Puerto Rico has not only complicated legal cases, but also negatively impacts the
lives of people who are supposed to be under the United States’ protection.212 The results from
the most recent status referendums on the island have clearly indicated that the majority of
Puerto Ricans wish that the territory would be fully incorporated as a state. Due to this strong

210

Ibid.
Brown, Alleen, “Two Years After the Hurricane, Puerto Rico’s ‘Generation Maria’ Leads a Climate
Strike,” The Intercept, September 20th, 2019, accessed December 7th, 2019,
https://theintercept.com/2019/09/20/climate-strike-puerto-rico-hurricane-maria/.
212
Willie Santana, “Incorporating the Lonely Star: How Puerto Rico Became Incorporated and Earned a Place
in the Sisterhood of States,” Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy (9), no. 4 (2014): np.
211

47
show of support, as well as the economic and political benefits that the island would gain as a
state, I wholeheartedly endorse the statehood of Puerto Rico.
If the island were to be incorporated into the Union, the application of U.S. laws and
policy on the island would no longer require extended periods of debate in Congress, as it would
be fully covered by U.S. Constitution. Perhaps equally as important as giving Puerto Rican
residents constitutional rights, I am hopeful that statehood would legitimize these citizens as true
Americans in the eyes of many continental residents of the United States, particularly
government employees. If this were the case, government organizations such as FEMA would
make the island as much of a priority as any other state. While this may seem optimistic, I am
not suggesting that a shift in perception of Puerto Rico alone would prevent another catastrophic
response to a natural disaster from happening again; rather, incorporating Puerto Rico as a state
would remove any ambiguity toward the amount of aid FEMA is obligated to provide in
emergency situations.
Unfortunately, the road to statehood is no easy journey, and has been increasingly
complicated by Congress’ continued postponement of a change in Puerto Rico’s status.
Furthermore, this process has been hindered by the fact that there is currently no committee
within Congress that is devoted to acting on the 2012 or 2017 referendums.213 I propose that
such a committee should be created immediately. This group should be headed by the resident
commissioner of Puerto Rico, the island’s non-voting representation in the U.S. House of
Representatives; Congresswoman Jennifer González-Colón currently holds the position. The
main role of this group would be to design and disseminate a final state referendum in a timely
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matter. Should the results from this referendum demonstrate that the majority is in favor of
statehood, this committee would then be responsible for bringing this issue to the House floor.
Finally, should the bill for statehood pass and be signed into law, the committee would oversee
the transitional process from territory to state. During this phase, the committee should work in
close consultation with the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization214 as well as
the Puerto Rico Economic and Prosperity Caucus to ensure that measures created to transition
the island into statehood are both economically feasible as well as successful in deconstructing
colonial systems.
As examined in chapter 4, it is evident that FEMA’s plans for disaster relief in Puerto
Rico desperately need to be redesigned. The concurrent disasters of Harvey, Irma and Maria
demonstrated that FEMA does not have a system in place that accurately measures the amount of
physical, material, and financial relief needed based on the severity of the storm. This structure
should be implemented into FEMA’s procedures immediately in order to prevent another case of
environmental racism from occurring in the future. Additionally, the aftermath of Hurricane
Maria made it obvious that many FEMA employees were not properly qualified for their
positions. As such, the organization’s hiring process should become much more stringent, and a
candidate’s fluency in Spanish should become a higher priority for consideration of employment
in Puerto Rico. Finally, it is imperative that FEMA offices on the mainland remain in better
communication with those in Puerto Rico and ensure that all employees receive the same basic
training across the board, as well as specialized regional training when necessary. It is only when
all members of the organization are held to the same standard that it will be truly prepared for the
next disaster.
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Still, FEMA is not the only government agency that mishandled the aftermath of
Hurricane Maria. U.S. Congress was incredibly ironfisted when offering aid to Puerto Rico,
particularly when compared with the packages received by Texas and Florida. While legislators
blamed this on Puerto Rico’s exorbitant debt, this is not a sufficient excuse given the United
States’ role in creating and perpetuating this debt throughout the past century. Despite the
confusing and complex nature of the relationship, it is evident that the United States has a
responsibility to protect the people of Puerto Rico in at least the most basic sense and this should
be adequately expressed in the amount of disaster aid received by the island. With this in mind, I
propose that a mechanism, similar to the one I suggested above for FEMA, be implemented in
which the amount of aid received by a U.S. territory or state is directly correlated to the severity
of the disaster that occurred. This is the only manner in which fairness can be ensured and that
all U.S. citizens are guaranteed the disaster relief they deserve as members of this nation.
Chapters 4 and 5 explored the impact of the island’s poor infrastructure on FEMA’s
response to the disaster as well as residents’ access to health services. The evidence provided
clearly demonstrates that Puerto Rican infrastructure must be improved in order to prevent a
similar situation in the future. Due to United States’ responsibility to meet the basic needs of
Puerto Rican residents, I propose that the federal government contribute to the majority of this
project. Updating this antiquated infrastructure would immensely improve residents’ access to
health services in general as well as in times of crisis, and would therefore be a necessary
investment in the health of Puerto Ricans.
Chapter 5 demonstrated the significant disparity between the health of Puerto Rican
residents and that of citizens on the mainland. It is evident that many of the health issues that
were exacerbated by Hurricane Maria could have been minimized or avoided completely if
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Puerto Rico received the same funding for healthcare as the 50 states. In order to prevent similar
catastrophes from occurring in the future, it is vital that Puerto Rico’s Medicaid cap is abolished.
Instead, funding should be determined by the percentage of the population who depend on
Medicaid coverage. This would ensure that the healthcare needs of nearly half the island’s
population are adequately met. Additionally, the U.S. federal government should increase its
funding to the Puerto Rican Department of Health in order to lessen the disparity between the
mainland and Puerto Rico of certain disease rates, particularly diabetes, HIV, and premature
births.
Each of the proceeding chapters has proven that The United States’ contentious
relationship with Puerto Rico has created significant obstacles for Puerto Rican residents to
achieve an economic and political stability on par with that of the mainland. This imbalance
culminated in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria, as the evidenced by the unequal distribution of
financial and material resources between Puerto Rico and the states affected by less severe
hurricanes. The events of Hurricane Maria demonstrate that the ambiguous status of Puerto Rico
is harming the island’s residents rather than granting them autonomy and therefore must be
abolished. It is imperative that Puerto Rico is incorporated into the Union in order to guarantee
its residents the rights of United States citizenship that they were promised exactly one century
before Maria touched down on the island’s shores.
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